1 What economists can learn from \Causality"
Economists have had a long and treacherous encounter with the notion of causation. While the standard econometric literature prefers to skirt the issue and relegates causal relationships to the province of human intuition, the more foundation-inspired economics literature admits the importance of capturing such relationships mathematically and usually concludes by lamenting the \con-troversial" and \illusive" nature of causation, The rst bene t readers of Causality should gain is the recognition that causation is not controversial or illusive rather, it is a well-de ned concept that is amiable to mathematical analysis. There is hardly any causal concept that does not lend itself to a formal analysis through the framework developed in Causality.
Neuberg mentions several economics issues whose analysis seem to escape the structural framework introduced in Causality, among them, problems connected with equilibrium constraints (e.g. that supply and demand quantities are equal at equilibrium) and behavior emanating from rational expectations. However, as mentioned on page 137 of Causality, the analysis of these issues can well be managed within the proposed framework, albeit one that invokes deeper, more re ned levels of structural equations. For example, the equilib-rium condition q D = q S need not be taken as a constraint but can be formulated as a consequence of cause-e ect processes involving inventory costs. The concepts and tools developed in Causality are basic to causal analysis at all levels of analysis. If intervention occurs only at the utility production level, as suggested by Neuberg, then the variables under direct manipulation can be made explicit in a deeper level of analysis, and the results would illuminate the coarser analysis. Additionally, Section 4.2 (page 113) of Causality s h o ws how problems involving function-modi cation interventions can be reduced to those involving variable-xing interventions.
To let readers judge whether Causality w ould merit one's investment o f t i m e and thought, I will now list a set of problems that a typical economist will nd hard or impossible to solve, and for which Causality o ers simple mathematical solutions.
We start by assuming that one is given an economic model M in the form of a set of linear equations with undetermined parameters and stochastic disturbances with unknown correlation matrix C . The only information available to us is the set of zero correlation entries in C (i.e., the set of disturbance pairs that are uncorrelated.)
Identifying independence in linear models
Given model M and an arbitrary pair of variables X and Y , determine if X and Y are correlated (for some possible values of the parameters, and for some matrix C with same zero entries.)
identifying conditional independence in linear models
Given model M as in problem 1, and a set of three variable, X Y and Z . Determine if X and Y are correlated given observations on Z (again, for some possible values of the parameters, and for some matrix C with same zero entries.)
Identifying conditional independence in nonlinear models
Assume that the model M above is composed of a set of recursive ( i . e . feedback free) nonlinear equations, with unknown parameters, and a set of disturbances having arbitrary statistics. Given model M and three subsets of variables, X Y and Z determine if X and Y are independent g i v en observations on Z (again, for all possible values of the parameters.)
Conditional independence in nonparametric models
Same as problems 3, except that model M is now composed of a set of arbitrary functions, the form of which is unknown, and the disturbance statistics is, likewise, unknown. The only information available is a set of subsets of disturbances that are mutually independent.
Causal e ects in linear systems
Given a fully speci ed economic model M as in problem 1 (i.e., all parameters, including matrix C are known), and let X and Y be two arbitrary variables. Determine the causal e ect of variable X on variable Y namely, the increase in E (Y ) due to unit increase in X . 
Counterfactuals in linear systems

Causal e ects in nonlinear systems
Same as problem 5, but model M is composed of nonlinear set of functions (with unique equilibrium) with known parameters and known distribution of disturbances.
Counterfactuals in nonlinear systems
Same as problem 6, but model M is composed of nonlinear set of functions (with unique equilibrium) with known parameters and known distribution of disturbances.
Identi cation of causal e ects
Given a nonparametric economic model M as in problem 4, and let X and Y be two arbitrary variables. Let the causal e ect of X on Y be de ned as the probability P (Y = y) that would ensue if we were to intervene and hold X constant, at x. Determine whether the causal e ect of X on Y can be estimated consistently from nonexperimental data. If the answer is positive, determine whether there exists a set Z of variable that can be adjusted for, to yield the desired causal e ect.
Identi cation of counterfactual claims
Given a nonparametric economic model M as in problem 4, and let X and Y betwo arbitrary variables.
a. Determine whether the following quantity, Q, can be estimated consistently from nonexperimental data: Q is the probability of Y = y that would prevail had X been equal to x, given that, in reality, X is equal to Neuberg asserts that \Pearl ...takes third variable common causes as the only source of confounding bias." This is not the case. Any association between two disturbances can lead to confounding bias, whether or not the association is created by a common cause. For example, an association can be caused by t h e two disturbances having a common e ect E , when the data are selected such that all samples satisfy E = 0 . This leads to the Berkson paradox (see Causality page 17). Graphically, associated disturbances are represented by c u r v ed arcs connecting the corresponding variables. Thus, the approach in Causality does not \rule out a priori" the problem of multicollinearity, o r \ t wo associated causes of an e ect." It in fact o ers e ective solution to such problems, elaborated in chapters 3, 4 and 5 (e.g,. Figure 3.8, page 92) . If the association emanates from selection bias on a common e ect, as in the Berkson paradox, the approach o ers a formal graphical method of managing such associations as well.
2.3
Referring to Figure 1 (iii), the caption reads \Don't adjust for Z when nding the causal e ect of x on Y ." A more accurate caption would read: \There is no need to adjust for Z when nding the causal e ect of X on Y ." The reason is as follows. The absence of curved arc between X and Z conveys the assumption that X and Z are not associated and, under such assumption, adjusting for Z is super uous (i.e., it may improve p o wer, but not gain consistency). Adding a curved arc between X and Z would qualify Z for adjustment by the backdoor criterion. Thus, to answer Neuberg's question, if Z and X are collinear, adjustment f o r Z is warranted by the back-door criterion, which coincides with econometric intuitions.
2.4
In the Conclusion section, Neuberg asks \If there are situations where the graph theory approach s a ys to adjust for intermediate e ects but statisticians say d o not do so, how c a n w e decide who is right?" The answer is simple. Conclusions based the graphical approach are mathematically proven, while those based on statistical tradition are folklore. The choice is clear. Fortunately, however, the clash that Neuberg alludes to does not occur in the model of Figure 2 . Statistical intuition warns us against adjusting for T , and so does the graphtheoretic approach simple adjustment f o r T would introduce bias. What graphtheoretical analysis provides, that statistical intuition does not, is the realization that the causal e ect of X on Y can be estimated by a t wo-stage adjustment for T , a s g i v en by the front-door formula (Causality, page 83).
